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ARTICLE
Power in the European Union: an evolutionary computing 
approach
Jonathan Golub
Associate Professor of Political Science, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of 
Reading, Reading, UK
ABSTRACT
Even the best existing model of legislative decisionmaking in the 
European Union, the compromise model, makes huge prediction 
errors when it is assumed that each actor’s power is determined by 
their formal voting weight. A few studies have attempted to 
improve the model’s predictive accuracy by examining alternative 
distributions of power, but extending their brute force approach 
poses daunting computational challenges. In this paper I illustrate 
how techniques from evolutionary computing can be employed to 
overcome these challenges. I then demonstrate the new possibili-
ties that this approach opens up by identifying the relative power of 
each actor that best predicts policy outcomes from the EU-15 per-
iod. Some actors appear to punch significantly above or below their 
formal weight, with power varying dramatically across legislative 
procedures. My analysis highlights important unanswered ques-
tions about power in EU decisionmaking, and potentially indicates 
fundamental problems with the compromise model or the under-
lying data.
KEYWORDS 




If there is one thing that the European Union (EU) does, it legislates. The EU may have no 
independent military capabilities and a tiny central budget, but each year it adopts 
hundreds of new laws. This massive corpus of rules creates an internal market amongst 
the (currently) 27 Member States, regulates the characteristics of traded goods and 
services, sets agricultural subsidies, establishes common environmental standards, gov-
erns food safety and other risks, manages external trade with the rest of the world and 
much else.
That the EU does so much that is clearly not trivial raises questions about the relative 
power of each actor in EU legislative decisionmaking, and who is best able to achieve their 
desired policy outcomes. Yet answers to these questions remain elusive. On the face of it, 
one might suspect that actors with the most formal voting power in the Council of 
Ministers, like France and Germany, dominate the legislative process, but the empirical 
evidence undeniably suggests that they dont. Numerous regression studies have found 
that states with more votes in the Council do no better, or do consistently worse than 
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states with fewer votes at attaining outcomes nearer their own policy preference. Even 
the best available model – the compromise model – makes huge errors in predicting 
policy outcomes when it is assumed that the power of each actor is determined solely by 
their formal voting weight (Shapley-Shubik Index values).
Which begs the question: what if the compromise model is basically correct but SSI 
values are problematic? Can we retain the compromise model, given that it is the best to 
date, but identify power scores that improve the model’s predictions and align them more 
closely with the regression results? A few studies have attempted to improve the pre-
dictive accuracy of the compromise model by investigating sets of alternative power 
scores for the Commission, Parliament and Member States, but these efforts only scratch 
the surface, and extending their ‘brute force’ approach more widely poses daunting 
computational challenges.
The main purpose of this paper is to illustrate how techniques from evolutionary 
computing can be employed to overcome these challenges. Then, to demonstrate the 
new possibilities that this approach opens up, I determine how much better we can do in 
our predictions depending on how far we are willing to allow actor power to deviate from 
formal voting weight. With the compromise model as the basic building block of my 
analysis, I employ evolutionary computing to identify the relative power of each actor that 
best predicts 162 actual policy outcomes in the EU-15, before the 2004 enlargement. The 
results, whether from a fully optimised model or one that only allows deviations that are 
much smaller than those considered in previous studies, challenge core assumptions 
about how the EU operates. Some actors punch significantly above or below their formal 
weight, with power varying dramatically across legislative procedures.
My analysis proceeds as follows. Section one reviews three well-known items from EU 
studies that will feature throughout the paper: formal voting power, the Decisionmaking 
in the European Union (DEU) data, and the compromise model. Section two highlights the 
mismatch between formal voting power and what we know about EU legislative out-
comes, discusses the few previous attempts to explore the accuracy of the compromise 
model when fit with alternatives to SSI values, and shows that extending the approach of 
these studies more widely presents an insurmountable computational challenge. Section 
three introduces an evolutionary computing approach that can overcome this challenge, 
then applies it to the EU-15 data. Section four discusses the results, identifies unanswered 
questions, and highlights potential avenues for future research.
Building blocks
In order to critique the use of formal voting power as a predictor of EU legislative 
outcomes, some preliminary comments about conceptual terminology are required. 
The literature on EU decisionmaking tends to use the terms ‘power’, ‘power resources’, 
‘actual power’, ‘capabilities’, and ‘influence’ interchangeably.1 Instead of attempting to 
parse these various terms, I will treat an actor’s power, whether a Member State or the 
European Commission or the European Parliament, as their ability to secure their pre-
ferred legislative outcomes despite initial resistance (Tallberg 2008, 687; Bailer 2004, 101; 
Thomson and Hosli 2006, 394; Schneider, Finke, and Bailer 2010, 86). Actors will always 
encounter at least some resistance; given the diversity of preferences on each legislative 
issue, they are never pushing on an open door.
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My distinction between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ power also follows the terminology 
commonly used in leading EU studies (Widgrén and Pajala 2006, 239; Thomson and Hosli 
2006, although Bailer (2004, 2006) prefers the labels ‘exogenous’ and ‘endogenous’), 
whereby formal refers to power conferred by the voting weights, agenda setting and 
veto rules contained in the treaty, and informal denotes any other source of power. The 
EU’s formal rules can seem labyrinthine, but fortunately only a few key provisions pertain 
to the present analysis of the period before the 2004 enlargement.2 The Commission is 
the only actor that can formally issue or withdraw a proposal. Formally the Council 
decides by either unanimity, with one vote per Member State so all must agree in order 
to pass a law, or qualified majority (QMV), with each state casting a number of votes 
roughly proportional to its population and about five-sevenths of the total votes is 
required to adopt a law. Under the consultation procedure, the European Parliament 
can offer its opinion on a legislative proposal but the Council can ignore it, whereas under 
the codecision procedure legislative adoption requires the joint agreement of the 
Parliament and Council.
Those who advocate a voting power approach to understand EU decisionmaking 
assume that each Member State’s power corresponds with the number of formal votes 
it has in the Council (Hosli 1996). The first building block of my analysis is therefore the 
widely used SSI voting power index, which attributes each actor with a score that reflects 
the proportion of all possible coalitions where they are pivotal; that is, they can cast the 
decisive vote to turn a losing coalition into a winning one (Shapley and Shubik 1954).3 For 
relative Member State power, the formal voting rule – QMV or unanimity – matters much 
more than the European Parliament’s involvement via either consultation or codecision. 
Under unanimous voting, all states have equal SSI scores since they are all pivotal. Under 
QMV, large states have more votes than small ones, but, as with most other federal 
systems, small states are heavily overrepresented. Large states each consistently have 
two or three times more power than small ones, and power does not differ significantly 
between the large or between the small states.
One can also calculate SSI scores for the Council, Commission and European 
Parliament. Under codecision, the Commission has no formal power relative to the 
Council because, legally, it can be excluded from winning coalitions. The same applies 
to the Parliament under consultation. Under codecision and QMV, the Parliament is nearly 
half as strong as the Council, or put another way, about as powerful as France, Germany, 
Italy and the UK combined. Under consultation and QMV, the Commission has approxi-
mately one-third the formal power of the Council. Finally, in the rare situation of codeci-
sion and unanimity, the Parliament has one-fifteenth the power of the Council, exactly the 
same as any individual Member State.
The famous European Union Decisionmaking dataset, from the book The European 
Union Decides (Thomson et al. 2006), provides the second building block of my analysis. 
This is the only available dataset that contains information on policy outcomes across 
many cases, which is necessary to systematically investigate relative power in the EU. 
A team of researchers gathered data during the EU-15 period on 162 controversial policy 
issues contained in 66 legislative proposals from the Commission. For each issue they 
were able to identify and scale the policy alternative most preferred by each actor (the 
fifteen Member States, the Commission and EP), the salience each actor attached to the 
issue, and the position of the eventual legislative outcome. This initial dataset was later 
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expanded to include 125 proposals, half of them from the post-2004 period (for details on 
the DEUII dataset see Thomson et al. 2012). It is essential to note that in using the DEU 
dataset I accept the project’s simplification of the EU’s complex multi-level environment. 
Although each actor’s preferred position is likely shaped by a combination of personal 
views, partisan considerations, ideological concerns and both domestic and supranational 
lobbying efforts, the dataset does not attempt to trace the coded ideal points back to 
some set of proximate causes or microfoundations.
The third building block in my analysis is the so-called ‘compromise model’. Formalised 
by Van den Bos (1991) and also used in Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman (1994), the 
compromise model is similar to a Nash bargaining solution and predicts political out-
comes to occur at the weighted mean of actors’ most preferred points, with weights given 









where Oa is the predicted outcome on issue a, xia is the ideal outcome for actor i on issue 
a, pi is the power of actor i, and sia is the salience actor i attaches to issue a. Simply put, the 
model posits that more powerful actors and more intense actors have more influence 
than the weak or the apathetic (Achen 2006a, 92). Importantly, the model is ‘not con-
cerned with the composition of actors’ power’ (Thomson and Hosli 2006, 402) – power 
derives from an unspecified combination of formal and informal resources. In the EU 
context, the only actors are the Member States, Commission, and European Parliament, 
each of which is treated as a unitary actor. Again, this is a simplification that relegates the 
messy reality of internal divisions, lobbying and multi-level decisionmaking to the back-
ground. Other noteworthy features of the compromise model, to which I return later, are 
that actors incur no penalty for taking extreme positions, and receive no bonus (or 
penalty) for how often they take no position, or when holding the Council Presidency.
Previous efforts to improve predictions
The primary conclusion from The European Union Decides was that the compromise model 
fit with SSI power scores makes the best predictions. Still, this set-up makes large errors. In 
substantive terms, its predictions typically miss the mark by 17–27 points on a 100 point 
scale depending on the voting rule and parliamentary procedure involved (Achen 2006b, 
276). If Achen is right that ‘a fair test of a model is that it does better than very simple 
[atheoretical] baselines’ (2006b, 270), then the compromise model as specified in the 
book is a failure. One obtains just as accurate predictions by ignoring everything else and 
simply taking the atheoretical mean of the actors’ positions (Achen 2006b, 277). This 
suggests that something is fundamentally wrong with the nature of the compromise 
model, or with the DEU data, or with the assumption that SSI scores are a good guide to 
which actors achieve their preferred legislative outcomes.
Although studies using the DEU data have found that the compromise model signifi-
cantly outperforms more elaborate procedural models as well as other bargaining models 
(Achen 2006b, 277; Thomson 2011),4 this doesn’t rule out the possibility that the 
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compromise model is merely the best of a weak bunch. As for the DEU data, questions 
remain about potential measurement error (Slapin 2014; Leinaweaver and Thomson 2014) 
and the improvements scholars might make particularly through systematic use of news-
paper articles (Selck, Yardimci, and Kathan 2009).
Yet what arguably makes the SSI assumption the weakest link is the striking mismatch 
between formal voting power and what we know about EU legislative outcomes. In every 
study that has regressed formal voting power (or its equivalent, state population) against 
bargaining success, formal voting power tests out as insignificant or even negative: states 
with more votes in the Council (thus higher SSI scores) do no better than, or do 
consistently worse than states with fewer votes at attaining outcomes nearer their own 
policy preference (Bailer 2004; Selck and Kuipers 2005; Arregui and Thomson 2009; Aksoy 
2010; Thomson 2011; Golub 2012a; Cross 2012; Arregui 2016).5 In pairwise comparisons of 
bargaining success, no large state achieves significantly more than any small state. 
Moreover, Denmark beats France, Finland beats France and Germany and Italy, Ireland 
beats France (and perhaps Italy), and Sweden beats France and Italy (and perhaps 
Germany) (Golub 2012a, 1302–3).
It is reasonable to suspect, therefore, that informal power almost certainly plays 
a considerable role in EU legislative decisionmaking, especially in bolstering the influence 
of small Member States, and that considering deviations from SSI values should improve 
our ability to predict outcomes. But so far we know very little about the distribution of this 
power. Bailer interviewed experts to compile a measure of each Member State’s informal, 
endogenous power, conceptualised as their respective negotiating skill and level of 
information, but these tested out as insignificant when regressed against bargaining 
success (Bailer 2004; Golub 2012a, 1306). Panke’s measure of each Member State’s 
‘range of negotiating activities’ (2011) proved significant when regressed against pooled 
data on national bargaining success, but not for proposals subject to QMV which are by 
far the most common (Golub 2012a, 1308). While suggestive, these regression studies are 
limited in that their findings are divorced from an underlying model of the bargaining 
process that could have produced them.
My analysis builds on the few previous studies that have tested the compromise model 
(or the very similar Nash Bargaining Model) with non-SSI power scores. Thomson and 
Hosli (2006) use the DEU data and treat the relative power of each Member State as 
entirely formal, given by their SSI score (rescaled so that they sum to 100), but then 
estimate the informal power of the Commission and EP relative to the Council under 
different procedures. They do this by brute force, repeatedly fitting the compromise 
model with different power scores for the EP and Commission in increments of five 
from 0 to 200. From the 1,681 (41 x 41) combinations of power scores, for each type of 
legislative procedure they identify the one that provides the most accurate forecasts of 
actual legislative outcomes. They find, ultimately, that predictions improve significantly if 
we assume the Commission has less power and the EP has more power under both QMV/ 
CNS and QMV/COD than indicated by their respective SSI scores.6 When he reduced the 
increments between 0 and 200 to one and examined 40,401 combinations (201 x 201), 
Thomson reached the same conclusions (2011:chapters 8–10).
In two other attempts to investigate informal power within the Council, Thomson uses 
these estimated non-SSI power scores for the EP and Commission and then alters the 
power of each Member State (2008, 2011 chapter 9). He fits five variants of the 
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compromise model, one where each Member State is assigned their formal SSI power, and 
four that allow dramatic deviations from SSI values. In these four competing variants, 
either all actors have equal power, the five or six largest Member States have equal power 
and all other states have none, the three largest Member States have equal power and all 
others have none, or France and Germany have equal power and all others have none. In 
several situations at least one of these alternative models returns slightly lower average 
errors than those produced by SSI scores.
Finally, Golub (2012b) attempted to improve upon a compromise model fit with SSI 
values by investigating whether Member States sell their votes within the Council. For 
each voting rule and legislative procedure, he tested compromise models with Member 
States’ power inflated or deflated according to their average net EU budgetary transfers, 
but none beat the predictions using unadjusted SSI scores.
These few attempts to investigate the predictive accuracy of the compromise model 
using alternative power scores merely scratch the surface of possibilities. Thomson and 
Hosli (2006) motivate their analysis by noting that the experts interviewed for the 
European Union Decides project gave dramatically different estimates of the Council, 
Commission, and European Parliament’s relative power. They then explored ‘all logical 
possible combinations of power scores’ (2006, 408) for the Council, Commission and 
European Parliament, even if these combinations were far outside the range of expert 
estimates for these three institutions, shown in Table 1.
But the experts also gave dramatically diverse estimates of each Member State’s 
relative power, as shown in Table 2.
The enormous range is likely due to the fact that respondents had different profes-
sional backgrounds, that they were not requested to distinguish between legislative 
procedures or policy areas, and that in the DEU data a different policy sector is predomi-
nant in each procedure. CNS/QMV proposals overwhelming pertain to agriculture, CNS/ 
UNAN proposals are mostly about Justice and Home Affairs, never about agriculture or the 
internal market, COD/QMV proposals relate mainly to the internal market, and COD/UNAN 
proposals deal almost exclusively with the internal market. Thus one expert’s rankings 
might reflect their views of relative power across all procedures, while another’s might 
reflect their impression of relative power in the particular sector they are most familiar 
with, or in situations where QMV rather than unanimity, or codecision rather than con-
sultation applied.
What we really want to know, is how much our predictions improve if we retain the 
compromise model and relax the SSI assumption for all seventeen actors. This presents an 















Note: The practitioners survey asked 18 informants to rank each 
institution’s relative power on a scale of zero to one hundred. Data 
from Thomson (2002). CNS = consultation, COD = codecision.
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insurmountable computational challenge for the brute force approach taken by Thomson 
and Hosli. With n actors and p different power scores we would need to determine which 
of p^n possible solutions produced the most accurate predictions. With fifteen Member 
States, the EP and Commission, and assuming 41 steps of power as Thomson and Hosli do, 
this produces 41^17 variants (10^27.4), of which only 1,685 have been compared to date. 
To try each solution sequentially, as Thomson and Hosli did, would take even the fastest 
supercomputer, operating at 10^15 calculations per second (1 petaflop), nearly one 
hundred thousand (10^5) years. Ranking each actor on a more precise 0–100 integer 
scale increases the number of potential solutions to 101^17 and the required computa-
tion time to over 100 billion years (10^11.5). To do so in the enlarged EU with 27 Member 
States would require 10^31.6 years. Allowing power scores to take on fractional and not 
just integer values increases the required computing time still further. When all of this was 
pointed out to me, it provided my colleagues in computer science a certain amount of 
amusement.
An evolutionary computing approach
Fortunately, an evolutionary computing approach overcomes this computational chal-
lenge and allows us to identify the distribution of power that best predicts outcomes. In 
brief, evolutionary computing works by mimicking the process of natural evolution to find 
an optimal solution to a given problem. What counts as optimal could involve either 
minimization or maximization. Perhaps most famous is the travelling salesperson example 
where a genetic algorithm is used to find the shortest possible travel route between a list 
of cities while visiting each city only once (Larrañaga et al. 1999). Evolutionary computing 
is routinely used in situations of complex production processes or choice environments to 
identify the combination of inputs or particular strategy that will maximize profit. An 
application of the approach that most readers might have already encountered (or at least 
benefited from) is in the scheduling of university classes to reduce the number of clashes. 

















Note: Data from Bailer (2004). The practitioners survey asked fifteen infor-
mants to rank each Member State’s power on a scale of zero to one 
hundred.
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The approach explores how the fitness of individuals in a population evolves over 
subsequent generations through genetic mutation and mating with other individuals 
within the population (Eiben and Smith 2003). It has been used occasionally in political 
science, for example to study social norms and cooperation (Axelrod 1986; Hammond and 
Axelrod 2006), as well as political redistricting and gerrymandering (Liu, Cho, and Wang 
2016).
To illustrate how evolutionary computing works, imagine that a company manufac-
tures eight different products, and that the relationship between production levels of 
each product and the company’s total greenhouse gas emissions is enormously complex. 
The firm’s objective is to minimize this total, subject to the constraints of remaining 
profitable and also producing a maximum of 100 units of each product. Altogether, there 
are 101^8 potential combinations to choose from. Figure 1 translates this ‘real world’ 
optimization problem into an evolutionary computing problem-solving space. The pro-
cess begins with a starting ‘population’ of possible solutions, or ‘individuals’, each of 
which has eight genes, labelled P1, P2, P3 etc. These genes represent the quantity of the 
eight different products being manufactured. P1 might be televisions, P2 might be 
refrigerators and so forth. Each individual’s combination of genes (i.e. products) results 
in a different total amount of greenhouse gas emissions being produced. Fitter individuals 
have lower emissions. The starting population would normally contain any 100 of the 
possible individual genetic combinations, but here we have just four in order to simplify 
the example.
Starting population
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 Emissions Average Best
66 95 54 80 66 16 56 6 4665.9 4585.1 4454.8
14 3 63 90 27 16 91 38 4587.1
40 30 67 32 27 16 91 38 4632.5
75 74 4 80 23 73 6 3 4454.8
Crossover
Mating pool point Offspring after crossover and mutation
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8
14 3 63 90 27 16 91 38 2 14 3 4 80 23 73 6 19
75 74 4 80 23 73 6 3 2 75 74 63 90 27 16 91 38
75 74 4 80 23 73 6 3 6 75 74 4 80 23 73 91 38
40 30 67 32 27 16 91 38 6 40 30 67 32 27 16 6 3
Second generation population
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 Emissions Average Best
14 3 4 80 23 73 6 19 4468.9 4544.2 4413.4
75 74 63 90 27 16 91 38 4548.8
75 74 4 80 23 73 91 38 4413.4
40 30 67 32 27 16 6 3 4745.8
Figure 1. Evolution with one-point crossover.
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The evolutionary process proceeds as follows. First, the least fit combination(s) (those 
with the highest emissions) drop out of the population, then the fittest combinations 
serve as parents and ‘mate’ with less fit combinations by exchanging some genes with 
them. The offspring of these matings, plus the survival of the fittest individuals from the 
first generation, constitute the second generation population. The mating process also 
allows for mutation, whereby a certain percentage of the genes passed on to offspring 
deviate from those of the parents. It is a well known evolutionary fact that some offspring 
can have lower fitness than their parents. Nevertheless, with a large starting population, 
selection at the mating pool stage tends to weed out inferior individuals and raise the 
average fitness of the next generation.
In our industrial production example, in the first generation the fourth individual is the 
fittest because their combination of genes produces the lowest total emissions, which is 
4454.8. The mating pool for the second generation, shown on the left-hand side of the 
middle panel, excludes the least fit individual from the first generation. The fittest 
individual mates with the second and third fittest individuals, each pairing producing 
two offspring whose genetic composition is determined by the crossover point, the 
location in the parental sequences where genes are swapped. Thus with a crossover 
point of two, the second offspring from the first pairing inherits the first two genes of one 
parent (75, 74), and the last six genes of its other parent (63, 90, 27, 16, 91, 38). Notice that 
the first offspring from the first pairing contains a mutation in its eight gene, highlighted 
in grey. Even though two individuals in the second generation are less fit than their 
parents, the average fitness of the population improved by over 40 points, as indicated by 
the lower average emissions. To find the combination of genes that yields the lowest total 
emissions, we continue this evolutionary process until all members of the population 
come to resemble the fittest individual in the previous generation, and no further 
improvement to population fitness is possible through mating or mutation.
When devising a genetic algorithm, the analyst controls several important factors. They 
can set the size of the mating population (usually 100–200) as well as the mutation rate 
(usually 1%). Higher values on either will ultimately produce a more optimal solution but 
will require more time to reach convergence. Crucially, one can also set constraints that all 
candidate solutions must satisfy, for example that the values of some or all of an 
individual’s genes must be different from each other, or must fall within a particular 
range, in our example less than 100. Run as an add-on to Microsoft Excel called ‘Solver’, 
a standard computer can evaluate thousands of generations in a matter of seconds, and 
normally converges on the fittest solution within a few minutes or at most an hour. The 
great advantage of an evolutionary approach over alternatives such as a non-linear 
gradient reduction algorithm is that on a non-smooth, highly irregular surface the latter 
tend to get stuck at local minimums and miss the superior, global minimum. And unlike 
traditional, calculus-based optimization methods, genetic algorithms work even when the 
search space is noisy and derivatives do not even exist.
To apply the evolutionary computing approach to the EU decisionmaking context, 
I treat each actor’s power score as a gene, and each possible combination of power scores 
as an individual with 17 genes. The starting population contains 100 of the possible 
individual genetic combinations. Each of these individual combinations is plugged into 
the compromise model (equation 1 above) along with the usual data on actors’ ideal 
outcomes and salience. Each combination produces a prediction error for each DEU issue, 
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and the size of the overall average error across the set of 162 DEU issues reflects that 
combination’s fitness.
The optimization objective is to find the combination of power scores that minimizes 
the average error. As many previous studies have done, I examine various subsets of the 
DEU data, dividing it according to which formal procedure applied – QMV or unanimity in 
the Council, consultation or codecision by the European Parliament. For each subset of 
DEU data, I first fit a compromise model with SSI power scores and treat the resulting error 
rate as the baseline. I then proceed to relax the SSI assumption for all 17 actors.
This involves a crucial decision: how large can deviations from SSI values be while 
remaining plausible? As a guide, I turned to the previously discussed handful of studies 
that have investigated deviations from SSI scores, since clearly the authors (and reviewers) 
considered these deviations reasonable. Thomson and Hosli (2006) examine all logical 
combinations, and thus deviations for the Commission and European Parliament range up 
to 125 points above and 44 points below the extremes of the ranges provided by experts. 
In Thomson (2008, 2011 chapter 9), his ‘big 5/6’, ‘big 3’ and ‘Franco-German’ power 
distributions assign some Member States power scores that are up to 80 points outside 
the range of expert assessments.
To find the absolute optimums, I allow the power of each actor to take on any value 
from 0–100. Investigating such a large search space follows the same logic as examining 
all logical combinations. Because some might question the face validity of this approach – 
is it really plausible that several Member States, especially the larger ones, could have 
power scores of zero? – I also reran the analyses while constraining the power of each 
actor to fall within the ranges reported by the experts. By comparing the three sets of 
power scores, for each subset of data we can determine whether, and by how much, we 
can beat predictions based on formal SSI values depending on how far we are willing to 
allow actor power to deviate from formal voting weight. To cope with the complexity of 
the solution space and the possibility of numerous local minimums, I repeated all searches 
several times with different starting populations.
Discussion
Table 3 presents the results of the evolutionary analyses. These results clearly confirm my 
main claim: that an evolutionary computing approach allows us to identify power scores 
for the Commission, Parliament and each Member State that sharply reduce prediction 
errors from the compromise model. For CNS/QMV proposals, compared to the SSI base-
line the optimum model reduces the average error by 12%, whereas the experts range 
model reduces it by 6%. For CNS/UNAN proposals, the optimal power scores produce 
a 38% reduction in average error, and the experts range model produces a 12% reduction. 
For COD/QMV proposals, the optimum delivers a 29% reduction in average error and the 
experts range model yields a 16% reduction. There are very few proposals subject to 
codecision and unanimity. Inferences about this procedure are therefore particularly 
tenuous, given the outsized impact that reducing the prediction error for a single issue 
has on the average, as well as the possibility that the estimated power score for a given 
actor reflects the fact they strongly opposed or supported the handful of particular issues 
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the optimum produces a dramatic 68% reduction in average error, whereas the more 
constrained experts range model offers a 38% reduction.
That the estimated scores often bear no relation to SSI values suggests that while it is 
‘naïve’ (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006, 252) to assume that all Member States carry 
equal weight in the Council, it is just as naïve to presume that their true power is reflected 
in their formal voting weights. But beyond this, what the estimates tell us about how the 
EU operates depends on the plausibility of the imposed constraints, and even then the 
analysis highlights important unanswered questions.
If we follow the approach taken by Thomson and Hosli (2006), whereby all logical 
combinations of power are deemed plausible, my optimal models suggest that EU 
legislative outcomes pre-2004 were determined almost entirely by a different group of 
between three and eight of the 17 actors, depending on the procedure involved, and that 
within these groups some small Member States, especially Sweden, Ireland, Finland and 
Greece, tended to punch far above their weight while large Member States tended to 
punch far below theirs. Equally striking, however, is that group membership as well as 
ranking within each group is often so different across procedures. For example, Austria 
and Germany both appear highly and equally influential for CNS/QMV proposals yet 
powerless under all other procedures. Sweden is extremely powerful for proposals subject 
to QMV but virtually powerless for those subject to unanimity, while Ireland dominates 
negotiations subject to codecision but is powerless under consultation. And the Big 4 are 
each entirely powerless under COD/QMV.
Constraining each actor’s power to fall within the range identified by experts is 
arguably far more plausible. Results from these models suggest that legislative out-
comes depend on groups of between 12 and 14 actors, and that under most procedures 
several small states have as much or more power than Germany, France, the UK and 
especially Italy. In some ways, fitting the compromise model with these estimated 
power scores brings its predictions more in line with the aforementioned regression 
findings and head-to-head comparisons of bargaining success in which large states did 
no better or indeed did worse than small states. But even in the more constrained 
models it is surprising how dramatically the estimated relative power of most actors 
varies across procedures.
What are the estimated scores picking up that would explain these surprising patterns? 
I suspected that three factors which don’t feature in the compromise model might 
provide answers: each actor’s spatial extremity, the proportion of issues on which each 
actor takes a position, and which state holds the Council Presidency (Bailer 2004; Arregui 
and Thomson 2009; Thomson 2011; Golub 2012a). Actors who stake out extreme posi-
tions risk marginalizing themselves, decreasing their coalition potential and thus their 
influence on legislative outcomes. Actors who take fewer positions and focus their energy 
on a narrower range of issues tend to carry more weight and achieve greater bargaining 
success. And decision outcomes tend to be closer to the preferences of whichever state 
holds the Presidency than to the preferences of other actors.
My initial investigation of these factors suggests two things. First, that based on their 
expected effects, none of them account well for the estimated power scores. For each 
procedure, the most powerful actors are not the ones who took the fewest positions, or 
the fewest extreme positions, or who held the Presidency most often when the final 
decisions were reached. And none of the factors appear related to estimated relative 
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power under unanimous voting. Second, that for proposals subject to QMV, spatial 
extremity might actually have the unexpected effect of increasing an actor’s bargaining 
power.
Consider Figures 2–5, which display plots of the power estimates from the experts 
range models against each of the three factors, along with bivariate regression results. As 
seen in Figure 2, in three of the four procedures, taking a position on relatively fewer 
proposals has no effect on an actor’s estimated power.
For example, under CNS/QMV, Luxembourg and Austria each took by far the fewest 
positions, yet according to the estimates Austria is very powerful whereas Luxembourg is 
entirely powerless. Under CNS/UNAN, the frequency of positions is virtually identical for 
Denmark and Austria, yet Denmark tests out as very powerful while Austria tests out as 
powerless. Only under COD/UNAN does limited position taking appear to increase an 
actor’s power, and only if we include the European Parliament as a stark outlier.
As for spatial extremity, most studies measure this as each actor’s average absolute 
distance from the mean position, whereas Pajala and Widgrén (2004) operationalise it as 
the frequency with which each actor takes a position at the minimum or maximum of the 
Figure 2. Estimated power and frequency of missing positions, by procedure. Each panel plots power 
estimates from the experts range models in Table 3 againt the number of missing positions for each 
actor in the DEU data.
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policy alternatives. Figures 3 and 4 plot estimated power against data for both measures, 
which are strongly correlated only for codecision.
Again we don’t find the expected relationships. There is no indication in either Figures 
3 or 4 that staking out extreme positions reduces an actor’s estimated power. In six of the 
eight panels, including all four in Figure 4, there appears to be no relationship between 
spatial extremity and estimated power. For example, under CNS/UNAN, for both measures 
of extremity, Austria took the least extreme positions yet tested out as powerless. 
Surprisingly, the two left-hand panels in Figure 3 suggest that actors who tend to take 
positions far from the mean Council position have significantly increased estimated 
bargaining power.
Finally, as shown in Figure 5, there is no evident connection between an actor’s 
estimated power and them holding the Council Presidency when proposals are adopted. 
For all four panels, R-squared values are near zero, with p > 0.4.
For example, under COD/QMV, Sweden held the Presidency far more often than did 
Finland or Ireland, yet according to the estimated results all three of these Member States 
are extremely powerful under this procedure. For CNS/UNAN, Ireland and France both test 
Figure 3. Estimated power and extremity (average distance), by produre. Each panels plots power 
estimates from the experts range models in Table 3 against each actor’s average absolute distance 
from the mean positions in the DEU data.
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out as very powerful yet France held the Presidency more often than any other state 
whereas Ireland never held it.
The regression results in Figures 2–5 must be taken with caution, especially since they 
involve aggregating proposals by procedure, but they still clearly indicate that more work is 
needed to understand how it is that small Member States – and different groups of them for 
each procedure – apparently manage to exert so much more power than their SSI scores 
would predict, and why under most procedures the largest Member States are apparently so 
unequal and often less powerful than smaller states. The possibility that spatial extremity 
boosts rather than erodes an actor’s bargaining power deserves attention. Likewise, perhaps 
spatial extremity, focused position taking, and holding the Council Presidency operate in 
combination rather than individually to determine actor power. Or they might operate 
differently for large and small Member States, or under QMV rather than unanimity, or 
under consultation rather than codecision. Other factors might also be at play, such as how 
urgently each actor desires legislative change. Just as ‘the relative impatience of a chamber 
will have an effect on its influence over policy outcomes’ (Kardasheva 2013, 860), relatively 
impatient actors would have low power scores. The estimates might also be picking up what 
Bueno de Mesquita (2011) refers to as each actor’s ‘resolve’, which varies by issue but in the 
Figure 4. Estimated power and extremity (min or maxpositions), byprocedure. Each panels plots 
power estimates from the experts range models in Table 3 against the percentage of times each actor 
took a position at the minimum or maximum of the polocy alternatives in the DEU data.
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aggregate could vary across policy sectors and thus procedures. Finally, it might be the case 
that particular Member States are much more powerful in some policy sectors than others. 
Since each procedure tends to map on to a different sector (or sectors), and studies suggest 
that in practice linkage across sectors is rare, sectoral power disparities would manifest as 
power disparities across procedures.
Conclusion
The motivations for this article were the twin facts that formal voting power is 
undeniably a poor predictor of legislative decisionmaking outcomes in the European 
Union, and that extending previous attempts to improve the predictive accuracy of the 
field’s leading model by replacing formal power with estimated informal power posed 
daunting computational challenges. My main objective here was to offer an evolu-
tionary computing approach that overcomes these challenges. This method opens up 
a range of possibilities for future research into patterns of informal power in EU 
decisionmaking.
Figure 5. Estimated power and council presidency, byprocedure. Each panel plots power estimates 
from the experts range models in Table 3 against the number of issues in the DEU data decided under 
each Member State’s Council Presidency.
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An evolutionary computing approach could certainly be applied to the DEUII dataset in 
order to identify the power scores that best predict legislative outcomes in the post- 
2004 period. It is noteworthy that DEUII differs from DEU not only because it contains data 
on all the new states that joined as the result of two enlargements, but also because it 
reflects the rarity of the unanimity procedure due to treaty amendments (Thomson et al. 
2012, 607). Formal power might have become a better predictor of outcomes in the 
enlarged EU than it was for the EU-15, or perhaps different actors now punch above or 
below their formal weight.
I applied an evolutionary computing approach to the compromise model because it is 
the leading model to date. I first extended the logic of Thomson and Hosli (2006) by 
optimizing unconstrained compromise models where each actor’s power could take on 
any value from zero to one hundred, and then fit more constrained – and arguably more 
plausible – models that forced each power score to fall within the range identified by 
expert practitioners. But a great merit of the evolutionary computing approach is that 
analysts can limit the solution space however they want, to make it more plausible and to 
test particular theories of EU power. They could, say, truncate the ranges identified by 
experts, or require that the largest Member States are dominant but possibly highly 
unequal across procedures, or that no state is more than twice as strong as any other, 
or that some states deploy their veto power more effectively than others, or the 
Commission must be at least half as strong as all of the Member States combined, or 
that old Member States must be stronger than new Member States, and so forth.
Finally, whereas in this paper I’ve employed the evolutionary computing approach to 
improve the performance of the compromise model, it might also be used to derive 
important cautionary lessons. For if it turns out that the only way to reduce the compro-
mise model’s prediction errors is to allow implausible power scores, then perhaps the 
problem lies not in the SSI values but rather, as mentioned earlier, in the compromise 
model itself, or in the DEU data.
Notes
1. For example, in Bailer’s survey of expert opinions, which I discuss later, the wording of the 
interview question about power (2006:fn8) illustrates the interchangeability of the terms 
‘power’, ‘capabilities’ and ‘influence’.
2. For greater detail see Hix and Hoyland (2011).
3. Throughout, I use ‘variant two’ SSI values, as they are referred to in the literature (Thomson 
and Stokman 2006, 48–49), which reflect the legal possibility that the Commission is not 
necessarily a member of the winning coalition.
4. Schneider, Finke, and Bailer (2010) consider a number of different bargaining models not 
covered in The European Union Decides, but they don’t test any of them against the compro-
mise model, and they use imputed values for missing preferences in the DEU data which is 
highly problematic (Thomson 2011, 42). Thomson (2011) also tests a variety of additional 
bargaining models, without using imputed data, but not against the compromise model. I ran 
tests myself and found that for the EU-15 period, his most accurate model, a Nash Bargaining 
Solution that ignores the reference point, does not beat the compromise model. Bueno de 
Mesquita (2011) introduces a more complex and possibly superior bargaining model that 
includes an extra parameter for each actor’s ‘resolve’, but he appears to have used imputed 
data (some of his results match those of Schneider, Finke, and Bailer (2010)) which makes 
interpretation of his results difficult.
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5. A recent regression analysis by Warntjen (2017) finds that more formal votes translate into 
more influence, as expected, but the study examines a different dependent variable 
(requested changes to Commission proposals, not bargaining success over final legislative 
outcomes) and uses a different pool of cases.
6. Unfortunately, their tests don’t distinguish between QMV/COD and UNAN/COD.
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